When Power Moves Closer: Who Will Protect the People?

State police may bring security closer to citizens. But decentralising power must also mean strengthening accountability.

Nigeria is at an important moment in the long-running debate over how the country should police itself.

On 16 September 2026, the National Assembly transmitted the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Sixth Alteration) Bill, 2026, dealing with the establishment of State Police Services, to the 36 State Houses of Assembly for consideration and approval. Under Section 9 of the Constitution, a constitutional alteration requires approval from at least two-thirds of the state assemblies—24 out of 36.

So far, as of today October 6, 2026, only four state assemblies—Edo, Osun, Oyo, and Rivers—have approved the proposal. A total of twenty more would be required to reach the constitutional threshold.

This is no longer simply an idea being discussed on television or at political gatherings. It is now part of Nigeria's constitutional process.

And that makes the question bigger than whether Nigeria should have state police.

The deeper question is this: If we move policing closer to the people, how do we make sure accountability moves closer too?

The case for bringing protection closer

There is a reasonable case for decentralising policing.

Nigeria is a large and complex country. Communities differ in geography, language, culture, patterns of crime, and security needs. A policing system that is closer to the communities it serves may have advantages in local intelligence, relationships, responsiveness, and understanding.

People often know what is happening in their communities before information reaches distant institutions. A police service that understands the people, terrain, and circumstances of a locality may be better positioned to respond to some local threats.

The proposed constitutional framework recognises this distinction. It envisages a Federal Police Service alongside State Police Services. The federal service would retain responsibilities with federal and national dimensions, while a State Police Service would be responsible within its state for functions including public safety and order, prevention and detection of offences within its competence, and protection of life and property.

There is therefore a legitimate governance question behind the proposal: Can government become more responsive when some responsibilities are brought closer to the communities affected by them?

It is a question worth taking seriously. But proximity has another side: when power moves closer to the people, it also moves closer to those who exercise political authority at that level.

And that is where the harder question begins.

When power moves closer

Police power is not ordinary administrative power.

It includes the authority to arrest, detain, search, investigate, use force, and maintain public order. The proposed constitutional framework itself recognises the breadth of these powers.

That means decentralising policing cannot simply be about creating another layer of police officers. It is about deciding who will exercise coercive public power, under whose authority, according to what rules, and with what safeguards.

This is why the question of government authority matters.

As I reflected in What Does the Bible Say About Government?, Scripture recognises the legitimate role of government in maintaining order and pursuing what is good. Romans 13 presents governing authority as having a public responsibility, not merely a private entitlement to power.

But legitimate authority is not the same thing as unlimited authority.

The biblical story repeatedly reminds us that those who exercise power remain accountable for how they use it. The warning in 1 Samuel 8 is instructive. When Israel asks for a king, Samuel warns them about what concentrated power can take from ordinary people. The passage is not a constitutional blueprint for modern Nigeria, but it contains an enduring political truth: power can become exploitative when there are insufficient restraints on those who exercise it.

That principle matters whether power is located in Abuja or in a state capital.

Public office is a trust. I made that argument in Public Office Is a Trust, Not a Privilege. The principle becomes even more important when public authority includes the power to restrict a person's liberty or use force in the name of the state.

The question, therefore, should not simply be: Who appoints the police commissioner?

It should also be: Who can hold that commissioner accountable? Who can challenge abuse? Who protects the citizen when the institution created to protect that citizen becomes part of the problem?

These are not arguments against state police; they are questions that must accompany state police.

Good intentions will not be enough

There is another issue that deserves equal attention: capacity.

It is easy to talk about establishing a police service. It is much harder to build one that actually works. A functioning police service requires trained personnel, equipment, communications systems, intelligence capacity, vehicles, forensic capability, command structures, welfare systems, legal knowledge, professional standards, and mechanisms for discipline and complaints.

It also requires money.

The proposed constitutional framework gives state Houses of Assembly the power to legislate for the establishment, administration, funding, and oversight of State Police Services, subject to the Constitution and relevant federal legislation. It also provides for State Police Service Commissions.

This means that the question of capacity cannot be postponed until after the constitutional amendment. It must be part of the conversation now.

As I argued in Competence Matters: Good Intentions Are Not Enough, good intentions do not automatically produce good outcomes.

• A state may sincerely want safer communities and still lack the institutional capacity to create and sustain an effective police service.
• A government may announce reform and still fail at implementation.
• A law may establish an institution on paper without giving it the systems, resources, and professional culture required to function well.

That is why the debate should move beyond “state police: yes or no?” We should be asking: What would make a State Police Service effective, professional, and accountable? What kind of system should Nigeria build?

If Nigeria proceeds with state police, the goal should not merely be to create 36 additional police structures. The goal should be to build a better security architecture.

The proposed bill already contains important structural ideas: national minimum policing standards, State Police Service Commissions, continued federal policing responsibilities, provisions concerning human rights and firearms, intergovernmental cooperation, and mechanisms for exceptional federal intervention (including judicial review of such intervention).

Those provisions matter because decentralisation without safeguards can simply relocate problems.

Three essential tests for Nigeria

1. Accountability must be independent enough to matter: A police service cannot effectively police itself. Complaints, discipline, appointments, and oversight need credible institutions capable of acting when political or institutional interests are involved.
2. Policing must be protected from political capture: The closer policing comes to political authority, the more important it becomes to distinguish legitimate civilian control from partisan control. A police officer serves the law and the public—not a political party, an office-holder, or a private interest.
3. Responsibility must be matched by capacity: States that assume responsibility for policing must have the financial, administrative, and professional capacity to sustain it. Security cannot become another institution that exists beautifully in legislation and poorly in reality.

This is where leadership matters.

The Nigeria we should build is one in which security institutions are close enough to understand citizens, capable enough to protect them, and accountable enough that citizens do not have to fear those entrusted with protecting them. That is the standard.

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A Conversation Already Underway

The questions raised here are part of a conversation already taking place on this blog.

From Nigeria at 66: What Kind of Nation Are We Building? to earlier reflections on public office, corruption, competence, government, leadership, and the poor, the conversation has increasingly been about more than individual politicians. It has been about the kind of leadership, institutions, and national culture Nigeria needs.

That conversation now has a home: Leadership & Governance: A Biblical Perspective for Nigeria.

This is a space for thinking seriously about leadership, governance, ethics, citizenship, and nation-building—not merely asking what is wrong, but asking what better can look like.

View all posts in this series →

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What should happen now?

The constitutional process should not become a race to collect numbers from state assemblies. It should be an opportunity to examine the institution Nigeria is proposing to build.

State assemblies should study the proposal carefully, understand the financial and institutional implications, consult appropriately, and consider the safeguards required before approving any constitutional change.

Leaders should ask not only whether state police can be established, but whether it can be properly funded, professionally managed, and independently held accountable.

And citizens also have a role. We should ask our representatives simple but serious questions:

• What safeguards will protect citizens from abuse?
• Who will oversee the police?
• How will complaints be handled?
• How will political interference be prevented?
• How will the service be funded and sustained?

These are not partisan questions. They are citizenship questions.

Nigeria does not merely need government that is closer to the people. Nigeria needs government that is worthy of the people's trust. And when power moves closer, accountability must move with it.